On September 8, gubernatorial elections will be held in twenty-four regions of the Russian Federation, including the annexed Crimea and the partially Ukrainian-controlled Kursk region. One of these regions is the Kaliningrad region, distinguished by its unique history and location.
The Kaliningrad region became part of the USSR only after World War II, having been part of East Prussia for centuries before. After the Soviet Union collapsed, it emerged not only as Russia’s westernmost region but also as an exclave of foreign states, some of which later joined the European Union. The region’s distinctive geographical position and historical legacy significantly influence its regional politics and make the upcoming elections particularly noteworthy. It is also important that in the 2000s and 2010s, Kaliningrad was considered one of the most protest-prone regions in Russia.
Who is to Replace Who?
Until mid-May 2024, there was little suspense regarding the results of the upcoming elections. The only feasible candidate for the gubernatorial seat was the incumbent head of the region, Anton Alikhanov, who had been elected twice. On May 11, Mikhail Mishustin proposed appointing Alikhanov as Minister of Industry and Trade, although Alikhanov had stated the day before that he would not be joining the new government. On May 14, Vladimir Putin approved Alikhanov’s appointment as Minister.
By May 15, Putin appointed Alexey Besprozvannykh, a deputy minister from the same transport department, as acting governor of Kaliningrad. On August 14, he endorsed Besprozvannykh’s candidacy for the gubernatorial elections. Besprozvannykh is a typical technocratic executive of the Putin era. He lacks experience in public politics, has no ties to the region, has not previously participated in elections, and has only worked as a public official in the Voronezh regional government and at the Ministry of Industry in Moscow. In this regard, he is like his predecessor, Alikhanov.
The thirty-seven-year-old Alikhanov is relatively young for a Russian official. Before his appointment to the westernmost region, he headed the Department of State Regulation of Foreign Trade Activities at the Ministry of Industry and Trade. In September 2015, he became Deputy Chairman of the Kaliningrad government, and a year later, he was appointed as the government’s head. Since he emerged in the region, state media began referring to him as a “young competent administrator” and “crisis manager.” Alikhanov did more than just handle administrative tasks. During his tenure, not only did he carry out technical directives from Moscow but also emerged as a conservative critic of “false European values.”
Alikhanov moved to a federal role in the context of a challenging situation in the region, the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Major consequences of the full-scale war include difficulties in maintaining connections with the rest of Russia, namely a ban on transit through Lithuania. Additionally, there are structural problems: a decline in industrial production was noted in the results for 2022 and later in 2023.
Ideology and security in the region
A significant turning point for the region has been its ideological reorientation. Once considered “the most European” region due to its location, it has now transformed into a besieged fortress. Alikhanov’s rhetoric makes this shift clear: “They are people who have lost the meaning of life. They believed they were victors, that they had reached the end of history, the triumph of their ideas and their international rule. Yet, the bloc no longer has any reason to exist … Even if these risks do not exist, they need to be invented and internalized.” This statement reflects Alikhanov’s response to NATO’s latest strategic concept, which identifies Russia as a direct threat to the alliance. The governor’s comments evidently fit into the regular pattern of official criticism of the defensive bloc.
Since the start of the full-scale war, the Suwałki Corridor has gained particular importance. This 100-kilometer strip of land between Kaliningrad and Belarus connects the Baltic states to the rest of the EU. Despite Alikhanov’s claims that Lithuania and Poland are not interested in this corridor, it remains a strategically significant element in NATO’s security strategy, as confirmed by both strategic documents and military exercises conducted in the region.
Russia is also closely monitoring the situation in the region. Kaliningrad holds strategic value due to its proximity to NATO borders and could have serious security implications for the region. Reports have previously indicated updates to nuclear warhead storage in the area. Russia may be considering the deployment of tactical nuclear weapon carriers in the region. In 2018, Vladimir Shamanov, head of the State Duma Defense Committee, stated that Russia had deployed Iskander missile systems in its exclave.
Fighting over Kant’s legacy
“I aim to convince you that Immanuel Kant, born here nearly 300 years ago, is quite directly implicated in the global chaos we are currently facing. Moreover, he is directly related to the military conflict in Ukraine,” declared Alikhanov at a convention in Svetlogorsk. A few months later, he also noted that Immanuel Kant, “like everything you see in the Kaliningrad region,” are in fact “Russian trophies,” and that Russia is “at the center of a raging cognitive war, where the adversary is trying to hide behind Kant’s legacy.” According to Alikhanov, this means only one thing: the need for a “Russian interpretation of Kant” and a “reassessment of Kant’s entire legacy based on current needs.”
Alikhanov’s drive to Russify Kant has received support from Putin. During a visit to Kaliningrad earlier this year, the President confirmed a familiar narrative of sovereignty in Immanuel Kant’s legacy: “Kant was one of the greatest minds of both the past and the present. He was a fundamental thinker. So naturally his call to Sapere aude—‘dare to know’ is as relevant today as ever. We strive to do just that. The country should chart its own course. The country should be guided by its national interests.”
The symbolic significance of Kant for Kaliningrad and the region cannot be overstated. From 1758 to 1762, he was under the sovereignty of the Russian Empire, which had captured Königsberg during the Seven Years’ War. His grave rests today on Kneiphof Island, often referred to as “Kant Island,” on the grounds of the former cathedral. Six years ago, when Kaliningrad residents were choosing a name for the local “Khrabrovo” airport, Kant topped the voting results. Many viewed this as a form of protest, which the governor also attempted to counter, stating: “The story of a special Kaliningrad identity was clearly made up outside Kaliningrad. Every foreign journalist always asks me about this special identity. Such identity does not exist!” Ultimately, the airport did not receive Immanuel Kant’s name; the voting results unexpectedly had Empress Elizabeth as the leading choice.
Social and economic context
As the country transitioned to a market economy in the 1990s, the structure of the Kaliningrad regional economy underwent significant changes. The region experienced substantial deindustrialization while manufacturing industries that relied on raw materials and finished products from EU countries grew. Major employers in the industrial sector include Lukoil Oil Company, the amber plant, and auto assembly companies such as Avtotor. In 2006, the region was designated a special economic zone. Alongside these companies, key regional employers include six defense industry enterprises, which employ up to seven thousand people. One of the principal enterprises is the Yantar shipbuilding factory.
Kaliningrad’s agriculture still does not meet the region’s needs. After 1991, Industrial agriculture struggled to restructure and adapt to market realities. Today, due to sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea and the onset of the full-scale war, prices for agricultural products have risen due to the cessation of European supplies and the region’s remoteness from “mainland Russia.”
In 2022, Kaliningrad ranked 60th among Russian regions in terms of income levels, with over 12% of the population living below the poverty line, compared to the Russian average of 9.8%. The long-term effects of the Soviet Union’s collapse and market reforms have led to shifts in employment structure and increased dependence on imports. These factors have contributed to social discontent and protest in the Putin era.
The Protest Era of the 2000s
For a long time, the Kaliningrad region was known as a protest stronghold and retains some of that reputation. In June, a closed workshop for deputy governors on domestic policy was held at the Senezh pro-government educational center. The workshop reviewed the presidential campaign and discussed preparations for the September elections. The presidential administration assessed the region as potentially problematic in terms of political stability, deeming it less predictable compared to other regions. As a result, the Kaliningrad region was classified in the “yellow zone” of stability for the upcoming elections.
The modern protest movements in Kaliningrad date back to the late 2000s. In January 2010, a large rally took place in the city, leading to the resignation of the Moscow-appointed governor, Georgy Boos. The catalyst for this unrest was a decision made in November 2009 to increase the transportation tax by 25%. This move was a severe blow to residents, who, due to high car prices in the region, typically bought their vehicles from EU countries. This discontent was compounded by healthcare reforms, school shutdowns in the region, and the lifting of the freeze on utility tariffs, which led to an immediate spike in prices.
Discontent quickly spilled into the streets. In October 2009, several hundred people protested; by December, the number had risen to up to five thousand, and by January 2010, the protests had become truly massive, with around 12,000 participants (with the city’s population at the time 420,000 people). The protests were referred to as the “Mandarin Orange Revolution” because of the fruit many protesters carried, and the nickname for Governor Boos, drawing an analogy with Signor Tomato from the story of “Cipollino”). The January 30 rally attracted Moscow opposition figures, including Vladimir Milov, Boris Nemtsov, and Ilya Yashin. As a result, Boos chose not to run in the 2010 fall elections, and his place was taken by a local resident Nikolay Tsukanov.
A rally of comparable scale occurred only ten years later, on January 23, 2021, following the arrest of Alexey Navalny. At that time, three thousand people took to the streets. Another notable regional protest occurred during the 2006 elections when a significant portion of voters surprised the authorities with the way cast their ballots. At that time, United Russia, already the ruling party, received a third of the votes, and “protest ballots” came in second: 16% of voters marked the “None of the above.” Consequently, it was decided to remove this option from future ballots.
Restrictions followed by the annexation of Crimea
In July 2016, Poland discontinued the Local Border Traffic (LBT) system with the Kaliningrad region. Under the LBT, Russians living in Kaliningrad could previously obtain a permit to stay in Poland visa-free for up to a month. Although it is currently something difficult to imagine eight years ago it was Polish politician Paweł Adamowicz, the Mayor of Gdańsk, who opposed this decision. He said then: “It is a bad signal that we are closing ourselves off. From a human perspective, it demonstrates xenophobia. Both Poland and Sweden in the EU fought to remove this border. It is the less fortunate Russians who are suffering, while those who are well-off buy Schengen visas.”
In addition to movement restrictions imposed after 2014, Kaliningrad inhabitants faced more serious issues. In response to Western sanctions, the Russian agricultural oversight body Rosselkhoznadzor banned the import of most agricultural products from Poland. According to official data, Polish pears, salad vegetables, and cabbage accounted for between 10% and 50% of all imports into the region, with Polish apples making up over 70% of total fruit imports. For an area without a land border with the mainland, this import ban led to rising prices and a reduction in the variety of available food goods.
The sanctions had a significant impact on the region, which had traditionally relied on imports of both food and non-food items. The primary alternative option became transit through Lithuania, which was later also significantly restricted.
Transit and transportation issues
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine resulted in the Kaliningrad exclave experiencing a partial transport blockade. On June 17, 2022, Alikhanov published a letter from Lithuanian Railways banning the transit of sanctioned goods through Lithuania. Three days later, trucks carrying goods were halted at the road border crossings. According to the regional head, the transit ban affected about half of the goods imported into the region from the “mainland.” In some sectors, this share was even higher: up to 80% of metal and metal structures were transported by rail into the westernmost region.
The transit ban caused significant damage to the local economy. From January to September 2021, imports amounted to $6.5 billion, while exports were more than three times lower, at $1.8 billion. By the summer of 2022, the situation had reached a crisis point. Avtotor, a car assembly company, was facing a critical situation—3,500 employees at the plant were at risk of losing their livelihoods. The company’s management responded with a 1990s-style solution, promising to allocate 300 hectares of land—ten acres per employee—so they could grow potatoes on their plots.
On July 23, 2022, a month into the blockade, Lithuania lifted the ban. This decision followed clarifications from the European Union, which assured that the ban on transit applied only to road transport, not rail transport. Consequently, Lithuania was required to permit the transport of concrete, timber, and alcohol through EU territory. On July 26, the first train from the “mainland,” carrying sixty wagons of cement, arrived in Kaliningrad. According to the European Commission’s guidelines on sanctions implementation, the general rule is that transit is restricted on automobile roads, with construction materials prohibited, while agricultural products are allowed. Transport companies registered in Russia are not permitted to carry any cargo through EU territory.
The issue of ensuring industrial and food security in the region remains pressing. One apparent solution is maritime transportation, specifically the ferry route from Ust-Luga of the Leningrad Region to Baltiysk of the Kaliningrad Region. The operator of this transport line is Oboronlogistika under the Ministry of Defense. By the time the transit ban through Lithuania was introduced, the route was operated by three ferries and one dry bulk carrier, with an additional ferry added by September. To address the region’s needs and facilitate the export of goods, Alihanov decided to attract state investment to complete the marine terminal construction in the town of Pionersky. One of Putin’s residences is also located there. According to estimates, the terminal is currently 32% complete. The operational commissioning of the terminal has been postponed at least twice this year; the construction has already been ongoing for over six years. Initially planned for completion by 2019, the project faced delays when it was discovered that around 2 billion rubles had been stolen from the allocated 7.4 billion rubles.
War and mobilization
In the Kaliningrad region, the share of mobilized individuals is higher than the national average for Russia. At the onset of mobilization, Sergey Shoigu, Defense Minister promised to mobilize only 1.19% of Russia’s reserve forces. According to independent research (due to the secrecy surrounding information from most regions, it is hardly possible to rely on data from state sources), the Kaliningrad region exceeded this plan by a factor of two: 2.4% of the mobilized, aka about 5,500 men were sent to the front. In addition to mobilized reservists and regular troops assigned to the Russian exclave, both contract soldiers and conscripts are being deployed.
There have been frequent reports of servicemen from Kaliningrad refusing to go to the front. As early as March 2022, fifty-eight contract soldiers refused to deploy to Ukraine. Mobilized soldiers have been making video appeals criticizing the military leadership in large groups, and some have chosen to desert. There are also reports that residents of the region are being held in captivity. In addition to shortages of gear and threats to conscripts to coerce them into signing contracts, officials have been struggling to meet their financial obligations to participants in the “special military operation” even over a year later. In March of this year alone, the region failed to pay at least 30 million rubles to the families of military personnel.
The number of recruits for the latest spring draft was increased to 1,400. Although authorities assure that draftees will serve exclusively within the Kaliningrad region, there are reports from both journalists and neighboring EU countries’ governments that recruits are being coerced into signing military contracts immediately and are being sent to new conflict zones, primarily to the Kursk region, where the Ukrainian army is currently advancing.
Registered deaths in the region are on the rise. In September 2022 alone, the mortality rate in the region increased by 27% compared to the previous year. The number of confirmed fatalities among residents of the Kaliningrad region now exceeds 350.
Production and prices
Since the beginning of the full-scale war, production in the Kaliningrad region has declined across all four sectors: mining, energy supply, water supply/waste management, and manufacturing. By the end of 2022, the region was leading in reducing industrial production rates. By the end of 2023, the industrial production index in Kaliningrad was 94.7% compared to the previous year. The production of transport and electrical equipment decreased even more significantly compared to 2022— it went down as low as 42.7% and 49.1%, respectively. Another major issue the region is facing is a lack of investment. From 2013 to 2019, investment levels stagnated, and in 2020, the pandemic year, it fell by 8%.
The authorities are trying to address the situation with substantial financial infusions into infrastructure projects. For instance, the regional administration is working to accelerate the gasification of Baltiysk, a military port city. Providing gas to this marine city has been a long-standing challenge. The deadline for completing the gas pipeline has been postponed several times, and by the end of 2023, the cost of the pipeline had increased by a third—from 600 million rubles to 840 million rubles.
Given that the automotive and electronics industries have been most affected by sanctions, regional leadership has decided to support these sectors. The aforementioned Avtotor, the largest taxpayer in the region, receives regular assistance. The total investment, primarily in government subsidies, is estimated at 70–100 billion rubles. At the beginning of 2024, the company was allocated 32.5 hectares in the regional capital for the construction of a casting and mechanical plant, in addition to two plants for electric motors and electronic control systems that are under construction. These plants were supposed to be completed in 2023, yet the deadlines have been postponed again.
Another “mega-project” being promoted at the federal level is the “gigantic factory” for energy storage in Neman. The decision to start production of lithium-ion batteries was made jointly by Rosatom, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the regional government. Authorities expect that this “gigafactory” will supply batteries for up to 50,000 electric vehicles and create 1,200 jobs. By the end of December 2023, the planned cost of establishing the facility had doubled and reached 51.5 billion rubles. The project is funded both from the state budget and through loans from state banks.
During the war and with the large-scale projects underway, more job vacancies are opening up in the region. Most new job offers are either to replace the workforce lost due to the war or to work on construction sites.
Healthcare
Currently, the Kaliningrad region is experiencing a shortage of medical staff. In 2023, the deficit was estimated at 1,700 people, including 768 medical doctors and 776 nurses. This shortage affects not only remote medical stations but also hospitals in the regional capital. The situation in Kaliningrad’s oncology center is particularly indicative of the broader issue. Construction of the oncology center has been ongoing since 2013, with the facility originally scheduled to be completed by September 2020. However, the official documents certifying the opening of the medical facility were only received in January 2024. The story does not end there. Alihanov claimed that the opening of the center was delayed due to licensing issues. Later, Alexey Besprozvannykh, the new acting governor of the region, has promised to fully operationalize the hospital in the last decade of summer—just before the elections.
Challenges and prospects
During two terms as governor, Alihanov was unable to build an environment that would enable the region’s development without significant federal subsidies. This failure was largely because of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For the Kaliningrad region, given its geographic location and economic structure, the repercussions have been particularly severe. Since February 24, numerous new problems have emerged, exacerbating existing ones. Previously, the region relied on stable contacts with European neighbors, but now such opportunities have been nearly eliminated.
In response to these difficulties, the federal authorities have appointed their new protegé, Besprozvannykh. On the ballot, he will be competing against candidates loyal to the authorities: Maxim Bulanov from the Communist Party, Yuriy Shitikov from A Just Russia, and Yevgeniy Mishin, local Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) coordinator. The only candidate with an alternative agenda, human rights activist Roman Morozov from the Yabloko party, was barred from the elections by the regional election commission due to allegedly incomplete paperwork submitted during registration.According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), Besprozvannykh’s recognition in the Kaliningrad region reaches 65%, with 69% of voters considering him, while only 15% do not. The election results are essentially predetermined, even if they do not reflect the true sentiments of the residents. These sentiments are shaped by the war and the region’s double isolation—it is politico-economically isolated from European neighbors and geographically from the rest of Russia.
