This text was written to start a discussion among the European left and progressive forces about a new security architecture in Europe. The first step toward such a discussion was a conference held in Berlin on November 30, 2024, which brought together representatives of left-wing parties from Germany, Ukraine, Denmark, Switzerland, and the Russian anti-war emigration. In their conference papers the participants presented both their own ideas and positions of their organizations, as well as critical comments to the report presented below. In 2025, the organizers of the conference — the Institute for Global Reconstitution and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation — plan to expand the range of participants in this discussion, which appears to be fundamental for the left forces, and are open to any proposals, including those that touch upon the ideas expressed in the report.
Introduction
A brutal war has raged in Europe for nearly three years, with no end in sight. Many initial predictions have been upended, from the assumption that Vladimir Putin would quickly conquer Ukraine to the opposite belief that Putin’s invasion has completely failed and his downfall is just a matter of time. Above all, the conflict has proven to be far more than a regional dispute, carrying profound implications for European security. By the end of 2024, the war has already reshaped European politics, with voters in many countries punishing liberal governments that uphold the status quo. The demand for new vision is growing, especially outside the political elites.
There is a growing danger that war will become normalized and take on new forms across Europe. The current climate, marked by alarming militarization in many countries and the rising securitization of everyday life, is fostering a vision of a more closed, isolated and fragmented Europe — one that risks neglecting critical challenges like restoring democracy, fighting inequality, and averting climate catastrophe. Avoiding this grim future will require creation of new conditions for lasting peace. It is clear that the existing security architecture in Europe can no longer deliver stability and, in fact, contributes to escalating hostilities on multiple levels.
This paper will examine a fundamental flaw in Europe’s current security architecture: the division into rival blocs. It will argue that this fragmentation perpetuates hostilities and undermines efforts to build long-term peace. As a potential solution, the paper will propose the creation of an overarching security framework that includes all European countries, and will explore how this new structure could interact with existing organizations, such as NATO, CSTO, EU, OSCE, and UN.
It is important to note that this paper does not address several other critical aspects of European security, such as Europe’s positioning in the US-China standoff, the development of a European army, the establishment of EU security structures. Nor does it offer a detailed plan for ending the war in Ukraine. However, the ideas presented here are intended to lay groundwork for addressing these issues. One key obstacle to meaningful discussions on these topics is the dominance of two opposing military blocs in Europe.
It should also be recognized that building a new security architecture is not a task that should be entrusted solely to current political elites. As long as social and democratic movements are excluded from decision-making on security matters, any such solution is likely to remain unstable. The ongoing international crisis is linked to a crisis of democratic representation, where one military bloc represents a completely authoritarian beginning, while in another, the existing governments lack popular support. The proposal advocated in this paper calls for overcoming the current model, in which narrow elites make vital decisions on security issues through opaque deals behind closed doors, and replacing it with broad democratic participation in security affairs. We argue that the suggestions presented here will make it more difficult for irresponsible officials to make opportunistic decisions and lay the groundwork for stronger democratic control.
Causes of War
There are two main factors driving the continuation of the war in Ukraine: first, the imperialist ambitions and perceptions of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and second, the division of the region into two rival blocs, which fuels a sense of threat on both sides. These factors differ in several key ways: the first is driven by individual agency, while the second is structural; the first could potentially be altered through changes in leadership or policy, whereas the second demands broader reforms at the European level; the first assigns responsibility for the war and its destruction to specific actors, while the second focuses on systemic conditions created collectively by all sides, without assigning blame or accountability.
This paper will focus on the second issue — the war-provoking division of Europe into two military blocs. However, it is important to emphasize that both factors are necessary for the continuation of the war. This is a war of choice, and Vladimir Putin’s decision to initiate it cannot be explained deterministically, as the result of a forced hand. Russia was not in immediate danger, either in 2014 or in 2022. Rather than seeking cooperative relationships with post-Soviet countries, Putin’s response to their moves away from Russian influence was to force them back into obedience, a reaction driven by conscious choice. This war would not have occurred without Putin’s decisions, made despite advice from both the Russian people and his own appointed officials, who of how counseled against the invasion.
However, at this point, even if Putin were removed from power, peace is unlikely to be secured, as the structural causes of the war would persist. The current security architecture in Europe is defined by the existence of two rival military blocs: NATO and the states that remain more or less aligned with Russia. Although Putin’s efforts to establish the CSTO as a viable alternative to NATO have largely failed, the logic of military blocs permeates decision-making in countries close to Russia. Armenia provides the clearest example: while the country is on the verge of leaving CSTO due to its inaction during the Karabakh conflict, the Armenian government faces a difficult choice between aligning with “the West” (NATO) or maintaining Russia as its military protector. Similar dilemmas are already being articulated by the governments of several Eastern and Central European countries.
NATO was originally created against the military threat from the Soviet Union, yet it was not disbanded after the Soviet Union’s collapse or the shift in Russia’s military posture following the end of the Cold War. Decades of Soviet imposed rule pushed former Warsaw pact countries to seek NATO membership, and NATO leaders largely accommodated these demands, assuming that Russia would either not view the expansion as a threat or would be too weak militarily to respond.
The objective reality in Europe before 2014 was that NATO had been continuously expanding eastward, with Russia seen as its primary adversary.
Even the most benevolent government in Russia would now face an external environment that is widely perceived as threatening. The reckless war started by Putin has led NATO countries to rapidly increase military production and defense spending. The brutal invasion and atrocities in Ukraine have fueled legitimate anger and concern, particularly among NATO’s Eastern members. This hostility is deeply felt in Russia, where the elites are convinced that Putin has permanently damaged relations with Europe and that Russians will receive no mercy from Europeans. Without efforts to address and mitigate this perception, any Russian government that does not see Russia as being in a hostile environment will struggle to maintain power. While such fears may be exaggerated, they have become a central element of both Russian elites’ and ordinary citizens’ worldviews. The partition of Europe into two powerful military blocs had made it virtually impossible for a peace-seeking government in Russia to maintain a stable position.
At the same time, dismantling the existing authoritarian system that has enabled one man’s war will lead to a more balanced and rational understanding of both real and imagined threats to Russia. Only a broad discussion within Russia, involving social movements and democratic forces, can distinguish between paranoia and ideological imperialism on the one hand, and genuine national security needs for the entire society on the other. However, for such a transformation to be possible in Russia, it must be made clear that democratization will not be associated with an increased vulnerability in the country’s security.
One might wonder why it is necessary to focus on the issue of inter-bloc rivalry when the primary cause of war — Putin’s imperialist policies — remains unchanged. There are two reasons for this.
First, as long as Russians perceive the country’s environment as increasingly hostile, there are few incentives for either Russian elites nor the general population to remove Putin from power. While the war has never been popular in Russia, with the poor far more skeptical than the wealthy, at this moment, all alternatives seem far worse. The widespread belief that ending the war would lead to catastrophic security risks for Russia had made any political change seem impossible. While the logic of rivalry suggests that Russian forces should be withdrawn before any meaningful discussions about the post-war world can take place, the reality is quite the opposite. As long as there is no viable future for Russia, the motivation for its elites or potential rulers to remove Putin and end the war remains minimal. They calculate that, regardless of the costs incurred from the invasion, ending it now would lead to a disaster far worse than anything they might endure under Putin.
Second, Russia will eventually have a new leadership. When that day comes, it is critical to have prepared options that would make pursuing peace an attractive and viable strategy for the new government. This preparation is urgent.
Another question that arises is: if Russia’s security concerns are recognized, why not begin negotiations with Putin immediately? However, Putin’s imperialist vision makes such talks virtually impossible. The war he is waging is openly justified by imperialist aims, such as the claim that “Odessa is a Russian city” and his boast that the Sea of Azov sea has become “Russia’s internal sea” for the first time since the era of Peter the Great. Beyond these territorial ambitions, the military bloc Putin is attempting to build around Russia is also deeply ideological in nature. Post-Soviet countries under Russian influence are expected to align their political systems with the Kremlin’s standards. These include the consolidation of vertical, authoritarian power, suppression of political opposition, and the promotion of “traditional values” – such as restricting women’s rights and criminalizing LGBTQ+ individuals. A recent example of this evolution is Georgia, which is rapidly moving under Russia’s control.
Recognizing the sovereignty of all European countries is fundamental to any discussion of a new security architecture. However, Putin openly challenges not only Ukraine’s sovereignty but also that of major European nations, seeking direct negotiations with the United States to partition Europe into spheres of influence. This makes him an unlikely partner for any meaningful peace talks. Nevertheless, is it essential to start building the conditions for negotiations with a future Russian government that is responsible, non-imperialist, and willing to respect the sovereignty of all European nations.
In this context, the military confrontation also carries a clear political and ideological dimension. As the ideas of free market and liberal democracy — principles NATO supposedly defends — undergo a deep crisis, the left has a crucial role to play. It must present a social and political alternative attractive for the people on both sides of the geopolitical divide.
In short, of the two main factors prolonging the current military conflict, the inter-bloc rivalry in Europe is the one that must be addressed first. It holds the potential to shift the calculus of Russian political actors and to stimulate changes within the Russian government.
Overcoming Inter-Bloc Rivalry
While it is widely recognized, particularly among left-leaning commentators, that NATO fosters bloc thinking, incentivizes mutual militarization, and ultimately contributes to instability in Europe, calls for reducing or even disbanding NATO are misguided. One could argue that it would have been prudent to dismantle or repurpose NATO in the 1990s, after informal promises were made to Russian leaders not to expand the bloc. Critics sometimes counter that such a move would have left Eastern European countries vulnerable to Russian aggression in the 2010s and 2020s. However, it is impossible to know whether this aggression would have occurred in the first place in a less confrontational environment. The assumption that Russia will always act aggressively renders any efforts to secure peace futile.
Now, however, the discussion about disbanding NATO is clearly ill-timed. Since 2022, NATO membership has become a crucial security guarantee for countries close to Russia, as evidenced by the swift accession of Sweden and Finland to the bloc. Calls for suspending NATO overlook the fundamental security needs and popular will of countries in Eastern and Northern Europe, where NATO membership remains a broad consensus. Proposals to end NATO without offering clear and viable security guarantees to populations who have every reason to feel threatened are likely to provoke strong opposition and animosity among Europeans.
It should also be recognized that, aside from its role in increasing mutual hostility in Europe, NATO plays, perhaps counterintuitively, a role of a relative deterrent to military adventurism by its individual members. While it is possible that any single member might decide to go to war despite the objections of other members — particularly in the case of the United States, as the leading military power within the bloc — membership in NATO still imposes obligations to coordinate with other members who may be less belligerent. This stands in contrast to CSTO, where there are no mechanisms for collective decision-making that account for the interests of all participants. In that sense, the immediate disbanding of NATO without providing an alternative security framework could lead to more, rather than less, aggressive behavior by powerful players.
A more promising approach would be to establish a new, overarching structure that includes all European actors, currently divided by inter-bloc rivalry. Instead of calling for dismantling of existing blocs — a demand that is inevitably perceived as hostile during wartime — creating an all-European security organization would align with the principle of the indivisibility of collective security. While establishing such an entity, uniting representatives from both blocs, is challenging during a time of acute conflict, historical precedents suggest that this task is not impossible, provided the initiative is well-designed. The Helsinki Accords of 1975, which led to the creation of OSCE, offer a particularly relevant example.
Three guiding principles must be upheld to ensure the success of such an initiative. First, security in Europe must be shared among all participants. Second, decisions within the organization must be consensual and binding, meaning that every member will have keys to European security. Third, the organization must fully and equally respect the sovereignty of all European nations, rejecting any notion that the security of some can be achieved at the expense of the sovereignty of others.
- Shared security. The logic of military blocs inevitably leads countries to perceive their security as being “against” others. While the formula “security against” became particularly pronounced in both blocs after 2022, this mindset had already been deeply entrenched long before. Both NATO’s expansion and Moscow’s insistence that Ukraine’s sovereignty threatens Russian security are rooted in the shared belief that collective security in Europe is unattainable. A new organization that includes all European nations must operate on the assumption that security is shared and achievable only through cooperation with others, rather than in opposition to them.
- Decision-making mechanisms. Participation in the new organization does not entail relinquishing sovereignty, but all members agree to abide by collectively made decisions. Military operations and the increase of certain types of armaments must be ratified collectively by all members. While the organization is not a military alliance, it facilitates and encourages joint military exercises among its members to build trust and cooperation. The consensus-based decision-making process ensures that all members have keys to European security, making security something implemented for all members, rather than against any of them.
- Respect for sovereignty. Each member state retains full and equal sovereignty over its security matters and is free to participate in other alliances and security organizations. This means that existing blocs need not be dismantled; rather, their European members would join an overarching structure without relinquishing their commitments within other organizations. For European NATO members, this would reduce dependence on the United States and establish additional mechanisms to ensure security – an especially timely development under Donald Trump’s second presidency.
The idea that joint security structures are needed to avoid alienating non-NATO European countries, especially Russia, is not new. This was the rationale behind the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, later named the NATO-Russia Council in 2002. However, the structure of this entity was dysfunctional from the outset: with NATO positioned as a unified bloc within the Council, Russia was tempted to build a countervailing alliance. The Council ultimately became little more than a negotiation table between the two rival blocs, lacking effective mechanisms to ensure agreement or enforce action.
The proposed security structure, which would involve representatives from both military and political blocs, can only succeed if there is a basic level of trust among its participants. This trust must be built on shared principles, with the unacceptability of war in Europe and the sovereignty of each country being central tenets. However, it is worth remembering that the relative success of the Helsinki Accords was not just about security concerns; it was also rooted in a broader set of shared values. These included guarantees of human rights (which, for example, led to a reduction in political repression in the USSR) and the imperative of nuclear disarmament.
Today, this framework clearly needs to be expanded and updated to address the fundamentally new challenges. Crucially, there is a pressing need for substantive democratization on all sides of the conflict. The concentration of power, crisis of political representation, and widespread disappointment with politics are felt acutely across Europe, serving as a breeding ground for irresponsible militarism among elites. Democratization could impose necessary checks on current decision-making systems, reduce opportunities for unchecked political maneuvering, and enhance overall security. This approach would benefit all parties involved, much like the emphasis on human rights that underpinned the Helsinki Accords. A shared agenda — such as collective action on climate change and fighting inequality — could also form a solid foundation for such agreements.
Rather than placing all hope in nation-states, the proposed approach advocates for a significant role for civil society, trade unions, NGOs, local and other communities in the European dialogue on security. The new structure, along with its commitment to democratization, will create a framework in which non-state actors can have influence in two key ways. First, they will gain greater leverage over governments in their own countries. Second, they will be able to address and appeal to the new organization, raising crucial security issues before they escalate into conflicts, and seeking support to encourage governments to adhere to the principles outlined in the agreements.
The Left, with its program of grounding peace in justice, can play a crucial role in building this foundation for a new and inclusive security architecture. Adopting this agenda by progressive forces across Europe would help bring programmatic clarity to the peace movement. In the current context of an acute military conflict and limited legal space for political struggle in many countries, the slogans of “peace” and “disarmament” can be filled with arbitrary content and manipulated politically by pro-Putin and far-right forces. It is time to replace vague calls for peace with a concrete proposal for achieving lasting peace, one that does not rely on the goodwill of individual actors with a history of opportunism.
The new structure should include all European nations as individual members, avoiding the inter-bloc standoff. Existing military alliances will remain in place and continue to influence the security calculations of individual members. This approach allows countries to maintain their security commitments. However, the shared membership in this new structure will provide a platform to balance bloc dynamics with the principles of shared security. It is reasonable to hope that if this approach succeeds, it will render the existing military alliances in Europe obsolete in the foreseeable future, enabling their dismantling or repurposing without compromising any nation’s security.
Implementation
What ensures that the new organization will prevail over the divisive incentives created by bloc membership? There is no sovereign authority over individual countries, and any member could potentially disregard collective decisions or simply suspend its membership and resort to unilateral military action. While this scenario cannot be entirely ruled out as long as states retain their sovereignty, there are ways to significantly reduce the incentives for non cooperative behavior.
Although lasting peace in Europe can only be achieved through agreements among all European nations, European security is a concern of a much broader set of actors in today’s globalized world. Therefore, the stable functioning of a European association would benefit from the participation of external observers. Major powers from the Global South, in particular, could play a key role as intermediaries, helping to facilitate dialogue between European nations. As the war in Ukraine demonstrates, countries like India, Brazil, and South Africa clearly prefer peace in Europe to conflict, if only to avoid global repercussions of war. However, these nations currently have little leverage to influence the behavior of warring governments. Granting them observer status would allow them to mediate more effectively.
While non-European leaders cannot directly prevent Europeans from going to war, their preferences cannot be ignored as long as they are expressed within a shared framework. All sides of potential conflicts are deeply influenced by their relationships with these major powers, and opposing their will — though possible — would come at a much higher cost. In 2022, leaders of these countries were involved in diplomacy only post factum, with no power to prevent the outbreak of war. Granting them formal observer status would give them a genuine opportunity to influence outcomes, along with the responsibilities that come with such a role.
One way these countries could exercise their leverage is through the United Nations, where each of them increasingly holds influence. The potential for being marginalized in the UN for defying the efforts of non-European powers would serve as an additional check on the harmful intentions of European actors. This consideration points toward the need for a substantive reform of the UN — an issue beyond the scope of this paper. It is clear that the ongoing degradation of the UN and other institutions that uphold international law will continue to be a significant obstacle to any peace-seeking initiative. However, the general strategy advocated here is to foster greater interdependence among all major global actors, rather than limiting cooperation to blocs and alliances. Creating a system of interconnected decision-making in Europe can help revive the spirit of shared security globally and reshape major international institutions.
China and the United States are less suited to act as intermediaries, as both countries are deeply invested in supporting one of the rival blocs in Europe: US as a leading power within NATO, and China as a close ally of Putin, who pledged a “limitless partnership” with Xi Jingping. Nevertheless, the presence of these two major powers as observers is essential for building consensus within the organization. Importantly, none of the observers would have decision-making right of decision within the organization; the point of their involvement would be to engage non-European powers as mediators before conflicts erupt. European security remains, fundamentally, the responsibility of Europeans — a key principle, especially in an era of rising tensions between China and the US. Uniting European countries under a single framework is crucial to preventing the continent from becoming a battleground for proxy wars between non-European powers.
Establishing a new organization is always a challenging task, but there are precedents that can serve as a foundation. The OSCE now remains a rare platform where potential members of the new organization have not withdrawn. While OSCE has primarily functioned as a negotiating table and is clearly not a model for the more comprehensive structure proposed here, it can still serve as a starting point. Negotiations to build a new security architecture in Europe could naturally begin within the OSCE framework.
Most importantly, OSCE proves that when there is sufficient political will, it is possible to create a new order among European nations. The 1970s were marked by a mutual willingness on all sides of the Cold War divide to establish common rules of the game. This process required not just individual negotiations, but the creation of a new, enduring entity with its own agenda. While the current conflict may demand broader cooperation than what was envisioned by OSCE, this approach remains promising for forging a lasting and inclusive security framework in Europe.
To make the new organization function effectively, trust must be built from the scratch. It is crucial to recognize that trust cannot be produced merely by signing agreements, as both sides are likely to dismiss them as not worth the paper they are written on as long as they feel threatened — a situation that remains all too plausible under current circumstances. Joint activities are far more effective in building trust than simple obligations. Therefore, the organization must focus on collaborative efforts, such as joint assessment of external risks to European security, military exercises, and the development of collective regulations in areas like cybersecurity and counterterrorism. Creating a shared agenda will be the most effective safeguard against centrifugal forces and will help ensure long-term cohesion.
Conclusion
As demand for a long-term solution to the military crisis tearing Europe apart grows across the continent, progressive forces should embrace the principle that naturally aligns with their politics: solidarity. Conflicts are unlikely to be resolved by erecting borders, stockpiling arms, or strengthening military blocs — even if these measures prove necessary in the short term. The establishment parties in Europe are desperately toggling between two equally futile options: leading a war with no clear endgame or sacrificing sovereignty of European nations. Both paths deepen divisions within Europe. This paper offers a different approach — one that seeks to build rather than undermine it. The solution proposed here is a collective organization that unites European nations within a new security architecture — a project that is likely to resonate with the peoples of Europe and is worth championing by progressive political forces.
The approach outlined in this paper aims to contribute to a just resolution of the war in Ukraine and Russia, as well as to prevent further military conflicts in Europe. While the specifics of a future peace agreement are beyond the scope of this discussion, there is a clear need for a forum where the divisive logic of blocs does not hinder the development of a meaningful solution. This forum should address critical issues, such as reparations, accountability for war crimes, and the right to self-determination. The belief that lasting peace can be achieved without conditions that eliminate incentives for resuming conflict is a dangerous illusion. For Europe, there is no returning to the status quo of 2021, but there is a way forward — one that fosters cooperation, solidarity, and sustainable peace.
The proposals for a new security architecture can only succeed if they are developed collectively by political forces across Europe — from East to West, North to South, and on both sides of the dangerous divide. It must be clear that peace is in the interest of the European people, while war serves the interests of the elites. Crafting a shared vision for a new European security system is a task for European progressives. Once progressives on all sides agree on the framework of a new order that benefits all nations, the appeal of such proposals to broader audiences will grow significantly. As long as progressives are united on the kind of Europe they want to build, they can lead by example and inspire others to follow.
