Having begun in February 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine revealed serious problems within the Russian army. Under real-life combat conditions, there was a need to reshape the Russian Armed Forces’ image and rebuild their reputation. In the first months of the full-scale war, it became obvious that Russian troops were faced with problems of low combat effectiveness, lack of communication and command, and an inability to provide timely support. Besides, there were reported cases of occasional panic among the recruited soldiers. The Russian army quickly exhausted its offensive potential and found itself in a deep crisis. The situation at the frontline seemed extremely uncertain, and, politically, Putin’s regime risked instability.
It seems that after the 2022 Istanbul peace talks had failed, the Russian authorities changed their understanding of the war and, consequently, their vision for how the army was to be organized. At that point, Russia had already become an outsider and started to abstain from offensive operations, while Ukraine’s armed forces operating in the east switched from defensive to offensive maneuvers. At the same time, Russia had exhausted its options for using a pretend army as a foreign policy tool. As a result, the government’s approach to the army underwent a transformation — its political vision of the armed forces turned into a military one.
In line with this shift, authorities transitioned to a different warfare model, gradually giving up the concept of strong political interference in military affairs. The changes first affected the operational-tactical and strategic levels. Approaches to planning and organization of future combat operations changed. The situation on the frontline was given special attention, and the availability of resources was assessed alongside the military personnel’s real capabilities. Nevertheless, many in the military considered it a mere gamble to launch a bold offensive on a broad front in an attempt to advance deeper into Ukrainian territory.
Having assessed the blunders and failures of the offensive’s first months, in May 2022 Russian military leaders decided to fall back to the pre-established artificial and natural lines of defense — those along the LNR-DNR-Zaporizhzhya-Kherson line. This is how the cohesive “North,” “South,” “Center,” “West,” “East,” and “Dnipro” groups were formed. However, the withdrawal of troops to pre-established defensive terrains did not solve the problem regarding their uninterrupted logistical support. It was first necessary to calculate the needed supply of combat units, as the possibility of a successful operation depends on the accuracy of such calculation. Manpower, food, medical supplies, firearms, combat vehicles, and ammunition are not infinite — their quantities are not random but are calculated per a specific task.
The most valuable military resource — or at least one of the most valuable resources — is people. The partial mobilization, ordered by Putin in September 2022, revealed a lack of unanimity about the war among Russian citizens and had a negative impact on the course of Russia’s military campaign. Under such circumstances, the military leadership faced a challenging task: to restore military divisions within the structure of the Armed Forces as soon as possible and to form the necessary army reserve. The fact is that a division, unlike a brigade, has a number of key advantages. The first two are a flexible support system and clear coordination between units.
The Wagner Group, also known as PMC Wagner, became the notorious prototype of this divisional model. The Wagner Group stood out against the background of Russian army units and gained wide media recognition. It is worth noting the group’s distinctive characteristics: high professionalism and constantly updated combat experience, advanced equipment and staffing, well-organized command, coordination, and logistics. Equally obvious were military discipline (no matter the cost) and leaders’ freedom in planning combat operations. It is also worth mentioning the extensive opportunities that the Wagner Group had in terms of recruiting new fighters — from aggressive advertising to prison recruits, the latter being illegal at the time. This is how Russia’s “patriots” and “militarists” eventually came to see the Wagner Group as a symbol of the defense of national interests.
After the failure of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s “march of justice,” things changed and changed dramatically. Putin approached the case of the Wagnerites harshly and reconsidered the autonomy they previously enjoyed. He saw what Prigozhin’s limitless privileges, fueled by his uncompromising criticism of Russia’s top military and political leadership, could lead to. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense took into account the Wagner Group’s methods of organizing combat operations, which proved to be efficient. Relying on advanced knowledge of the Wagner Group and engaging its former members as instructors, the Russian army began introducing a streamlined system of military training that allowed it to prepare soldiers in a short period of time. On the frontline, they transitioned to combined attacks using artillery and drones. In terms of troop organization, the Russian army widened their recruiting methods — following the Wagner example, they began recruiting prisoners and consequently adjusted relevant legislation. As a result, prisoners have received the opportunity to avoid prosecution by signing a contract for military service with the Ministry of Defense.
A New Approach
One of the General Staff of the Russian Army’s main tasks is the systematic replenishment of personnel units engaged in war. As we have already seen, the principles of organization and construction of a combat-effective group were adopted from the Wagner Group. How did this manifest itself in practice and what changes did it lead to? One of the most indicative changes has been the emergence of numerous volunteer units, which are not yet fully autonomous. In fact, any armed group is now obliged to sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense. Against this background, the role of different regions of the country in providing and forming military squads has significantly increased. The way fighters are incentivized has also changed. Recent recruitment dynamics, as well as the volunteers’ rhetoric, reveal one fact: Russian authorities have managed to affect its potential fighters’ perception of war.
Why did the Ministry of Defense decide to prompt the emergence of volunteer units, which are usually difficult to control? What could be their reason? First was the need to recruit people from various social groups to replenish military personnel. Second was the case of the Wagner Group, whose fighters turned into rebels, taking part in Prigozhin’s march. Taking into account these two aspects, the Ministry of Defense opted for a new approach, co-opting the Wagner model. Now it has almost no competition in the military sector, and its possible emergence is extremely limited.
Today, the exact number of volunteer units is not disclosed and remains classified. Nevertheless, it is possible to take a look at the available data, which is based on social media monitoring. With all its limitations, even such data highlights the structure of volunteer unit distribution by military districts. This means that these units are directly subordinate to the Russian army groupings (which include military units of military districts). This is done to facilitate military management, staffing, and training — after all, all this takes place on the basis of the military units and training infrastructure. In addition, the units have an organic link with regional administrations, which helps them with supply and logistics.
A Mercenary or a Volunteer?
The very term “volunteer units” here is not accidental. If you read this article carefully, you will notice that I prefer not to use the “PMC,” private military company, term in this analysis. The point here is not that volunteer squads and private mercenary companies are different in their functional sense. Russian legislation has little to say about the regulation of the activities of private military companies specifically. To be more precise, these activities are defined only by Article 359 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation — the article on mercenary activity. If we attempt to define a mercenary, we would have to say that it is a person who receives material compensation and does not hold state citizenship participating in an armed conflict. Why then are there “volunteers” from Syria, Africa, Germany, Cuba, and other countries within the ranks of the Russian army? Moreover, why do Russian citizens fall under Article 359 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation alongside foreigners?
The solution to this legal conflict can be found in Federal Law No. 419 “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation,” adopted six months after the invasion, that is, on November 4, 2022. Some also call it “the law on volunteers,” even though this is not correct and even conceals the real intentions behind this law. The idea behind it was to change the legal framework regulating mechanisms of involving individuals and citizens in combat operations. In other words, the law was designed to legitimize the status of a mercenary.
Furthermore, the term “volunteer formations” became a legal term once it was introduced into legislative circulation. Several of the basic army laws: No. 61-FZ “On Defense,” No. 31-F3 “On Mobilization Preparation and Mobilization in the Russian Federation,” and No. 76-FZ “On the Status of Military Personnel” were amended, which made it possible to adjust the legislative system to the needs of the front in the shortest possible time. According to the current law, almost any person who meets the criteria can join the Russian Armed Forces — even a foreigner. In addition, there are new regulations that prescribe allowances and social benefits for volunteers and their family members.
One specific detail should be noted. The relationship between a volunteer and the Ministry of Defense is mediated by the contract that defines each party’s obligations. Officially, such a contract is valid for three months, but having signed it, people, in fact, fall into real bondage. How does this happen? Volunteers are obliged to sign an additional agreement to the contract, which implies their inclusion in the military reserve. After signing this document, they can no longer simply leave the unit after their three-month contract expires. Refusal to continue their service entails criminal liability. Since mobilization has not been officially terminated, the person who has signed this additional agreement ends up in the mobilization reserve. Consequently, according to fresh amendments to the legislation, the volunteer reserve is used to protect state interests both inside and outside the country. In other words, the fighter will be in the unit for as long as the Ministry of Defense requires him to be so. In addition, according to the contract language, no difference is made between a volunteer, a foreigner, a mobilized or simple fighter of the Russian army: each of them is considered a serviceman in accordance with the Federal Law “On the Status of a Serviceman.”
Serving the Regime
In practice, the no-difference technique at the legislative level turns out to be very efficient in terms of continuously replenishing the unit personnel. This is what the current situation at the front shows — Russian units have been carrying out offensive operations along the entire line of contact for a long time. The systematic flow of volunteers joining the Russian army also, alas, suggests that the measures taken to attract new forces have been successful. Let us now try to understand what drives people to do this, what and who pushes them to voluntarily enlist in the military. When it comes to decisions that are directly related to life and death and even decisions of a moral and political nature, it is not easy to talk about human motivations. Let us try to simply list a set of factors that can be identified.
The first of these factors is obviously money. For many Russians, especially those living in poor regions of the country, the monetary incentives for the contract service, which start from 200,000 rubles, are a lot. Having signed the contract, people get the opportunity to solve severe household problems, pay back their loans, or buy property. This is how a person tries to free himself from debt bondage but becomes dependent again, now bonded by the contract — a deadly one. According to statistics, more than 40 percent of Russians are experiencing financial difficulties, and it is these people who respond to the government’s offer to earn a living, putting their lives, as well as the lives of others, on the line.
The second factor is ideology, or people’s political views, which ideologically color their motivations. A unique example here is the neo-Nazis serving in paramilitary units such as the Rusich group and Española battalion. One may find the presence of Nazi groups at the frontline contradictory as it opposes the originally stated objectives of the war (as it was officially declared, Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine was aimed to “denazify” the country). However, if we put aside sonorous newspaper headlines and dive into the problem in detail, we can hear how people share their reasons and their motivations on their own. In fact, many volunteers, not necessarily having nationalistic views or belonging to the neo-Nazi groups, claim to join the service in order to defend the country’s interests; they believe that they carry on a mission to defend the fatherland and unite against a common enemy. It is important to note that these volunteers do not see Ukrainian men or women as enemies; for them, the real foes are NATO and “Zelensky’s regime.” Some will also say that they are fighting to regain Russia’s power that it had lost.
In light of the above, a third factor is definitely worth mentioning — large-scale state propaganda around military service. These days Russian propaganda has specific features that allow us to understand how it works. First, information is delivered and propagated systematically, with the use of all possible channels. Information about the ways of joining the Russian army is advertised by regional state authorities, mass media, educational institutions, and enterprises; moreover, it is delivered on social media. Second, this propaganda machine is also active outside Russia and is targeted at foreigners, as well as at Russians. Third, propaganda also relies on people’s moral feelings and religious beliefs, exploiting them to strengthen their influence on one’s decision to join the army and go to war. This is the hand that the leaders play not only to recruit but also to keep soldiers in the trenches.
Bloody Business
At some point, Ukrainian Intelligence spread the word that large Russian state-owned companies created their own private military companies. As for military experts, their analysis and opinions on this matter differ. One of their ideas is that modern Russian PMCs may be financed from the budgets of state-owned companies. However, this situation seems rather unlikely. All in all, the country is involved in an armed conflict and it needs to provide for the army’s and defense industry’s huge needs. So the fact is that the war is supported by both civilian and military infrastructure.
In this respect, the state structures form a single centralized mechanism in which each element is interconnected and performs its function. “Volunteer units” represent a part of this state-controlled system. On the one hand, they are connected to the country’s war economy: funds are accumulated from the treasury and distributed among volunteer units in a centralized and organized manner, and on the other hand, these units are controlled and managed by the Ministry of Defense. This whole cycle is regulated by the state, that is, directed by the military-political leadership. Therefore, it is not quite correct to emphasize the role of large state-owned companies as individual players — they are simply part and parcel of this distribution system. Money comes into the state budget from both ordinary citizens and businesses, including large state-owned companies. In other words, they should be seen as just one element of a larger economic and political picture.
Strangely enough, volunteer units, which emerged following the model of the private military companies, have only made Russian officials richer. How did this come to happen? Along with the new units, additional systems of supply, logistics, recruitment, and information support were introduced, and money circulated alongside these systems. There are military commanders and officials who are in charge of distributing resources and funds. Today, these individuals earn and continue to earn huge amounts of money — money made on the deaths of Ukrainians and Russians. These people are the key beneficiaries of the bloody business that they now organize and control.
The military model adopted from the PMCs and updated by the Ministry of Defense continues to serve the regime’s interests. Relying on this model, the ministry lures a significant part of the Russian population into its networks. This entails serious social problems, even if these problems are not visible today. Propaganda, money, and privileges are temporary tools of power. Be that as it may, behind the intention to protect Russia’s interests, which volunteers share, there is someone’s hypocrisy, lies, and thousands injured and dead. The war and the huge apparatus formed around military needs bring death and misery — this is what lies behind Russian officials’ full pockets today.
