On September 28, 2024, International Safe Abortion Day, Russian feminists and women-led initiatives launched an online campaign with the hashtag #September28. Many public figures and activists supported the campaign, speaking out about the increasing reproductive pressure on women and urging support for pro-choice initiatives.
A few days prior, Federation Council Chair Valentina Matviyenko and Vyacheslav Volodin, the chairman of the State Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament), announced that a bill to prohibit “child-free propaganda” would be introduced in the State Duma. The law’s adoption could lead to unpredictable legal consequences — potentially even the prosecution of women who publicly discuss difficulties with pregnancy and childbirth on social media. Russian officials currently attribute decisions to forego childbirth to the results of Western propaganda and the activities of organizations hostile to the regime. Amid the war, reproductive pressure on Russian citizens has intensified, at least at the rhetorical level. Regime spokespeople frequently contrast the value of large families with the hedonism allegedly imposed upon citizens by the West and the “child-free and LGBT+ ideology.”
Reproductive Pressure Before the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine
Ideas advocating for a ban on elective abortions, enforcing large families, and prohibiting contraception began to emerge in Russia in the 1990s, voiced by representatives of two distinct conservative groups. One group was the nationalist Russian All-National Union, which sought the revival of “Great Russia” and the “Eurasian unity of Slavic peoples.” The other included those who adopted American pro-life ideology, such as the interregional public organization “Life.” These two groups seemed to have little in common at that time; both were small and lacked significant influence, while the country appeared to be moving toward anything but radical conservatism. However, the marginal ambitions of Russian nationalists and pro-American pro-lifers from the ’90s began to take shape as reality in the 2000s.
Excess mortality, low birth rates, and declining life expectancy in the 1990s led to demographic decline. Initially, birth rates fell below the replacement fertility rate of 2.1 births per woman. By 1992, the birth rate in Russia dropped below the death rate. The sharp increase in mortality in the ’90s, combined with low birth rates, resulted in depopulation, a phenomenon demographers referred to as the “Russian Cross.”
In the 2000s, Russian authorities aimed to rectify the demographic crisis by implementing measures intended to positively impact birth rates. The most well-known of these initiatives was the Maternity Capital Program. Launched in 2007, the program provided families with 250,000 rubles for the birth of a second or subsequent child. The money could be used to purchase housing, invest in the children’s future education, or contribute to the mother’s pension. According to independent demographer Alexey Raksha, approximately 2–2.5 million infants were born, accounting for approximately 7–9% of all births and 13–17% of second and subsequent births. However, there were other, more restrictive measures that received much less public attention.
Until the end of 2007, there was a list of social criteria for obtaining an abortion for pregnancies up to 22 weeks, which included circumstances such as the husband’s death or disability, or the woman being imprisoned. By early 2008, rape was deemed the only social criteria to abort a pregnancy within this timeframe. All other elective pregnancy terminations could only be performed up to 12 weeks of gestation. Additionally, over 90 out of the 135 types of medical indications for terminating a pregnancy were removed from the allowed list. At that time, the Russian Ministry of Health also aimed to decrease the number of cesarean sections and increase the number of natural births. While the connection between this measure and the increase in birth rates may not seem obvious, it does exist. Cesarean sections limit the number of potential births to a maximum of 3–4, and in rare cases, up to 5, whereas natural childbirth can result in 10 or even 20 children. Meanwhile, a very cynical attitude toward mothers began to emerge within the obstetrics community, suggesting that it did not matter if a child died during birth because there would be no scar on the uterus, allowing a woman to have more children.
Although the government began implementing reproductive pressure measures on women in the mid-2000s, at the time the general public hardly noticed these changes. The Maternity Capital Program was encouraging the birth of second and third children among those born in the 1970s, while a large generation born in the 1980s was just entering their active reproductive age. The authorities were satisfied with the rising birth rates. Meanwhile, the state’s motivating and incentivizing measures were constantly highlighted in federal media, while the reductions in medical and social grounds for abortion received little media attention. At the time, it seemed that these changes were minor and would not lead to serious restrictions on access to pregnancy terminations, as abortions on demand were still quite accessible. However, regular measures began to be introduced that made access to abortions more difficult. In 2011, “days” and “weeks of silence” were implemented: there is a seven-day waiting period for a woman to reconsider her decision after she contacts a clinic to request an abortion. In 2012, “pre-abortion psychological counseling” was introduced, and in 2013, a ban on advertising abortions was enacted.
The situation regarding reproductive rights began to worsen in 2014. With the decline of the national currency and real income, by 2016, the Maternity Capital Program had exhausted its effectiveness. Concurrently, a smaller generation born in the 1990s was entering active reproductive age. Additionally, state-level propaganda promoting “traditional values” intensified, discussions about “civilizational opposition between Russia and the West” grew, and conservative sentiments, along with the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, strengthened.
Traditionalist lawmakers and officials from the Russian Orthodox Church began to call periodically for the removal of abortions from the mandatory health insurance system or for their prohibition in private clinics. Anti-abortion initiatives, sponsored by the state, the church, and Orthodox oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev, spread across the regions. An Orthodox Russian nationalist, Malofeyev created the Orthodox-conservative television channel Tsargrad, which financially supported many pro-life organizations and lobbied for amendments promoting “family values” in the Russian Constitution, as well as for repressive laws against LGBT+ individuals and the child-free movement. Оbstacles to abortion began to emerge, such as extending the permissible timeframes for conducting abortion procedures and misleading patients into believing they would be unable to conceive again after an abortion. In reality, by 2002, the complication rate following an abortion in Russia was only 1.4%. When performed by specialists in a sterile medical environment, the overall risk of the procedure is minimal for a woman’s health and life, amounting to 0.3%.
From 2016 to 2018, temporary abortion bans were introduced in several regions of Russia. In Primorsky Krai, the ban was implemented for three days in August 2016 as part of a state campaign called “Give Me Life.” In 2017, the Chuvash Republic prohibited abortions on International Children’s Day. In July and August 2018, temporary short-term bans on abortions were enacted in the Ryazan region, Primorsky Krai, and Yakutia.
In 2017, the Ministry of Health circulated a letter with recommendations aimed at discouraging women from terminating pregnancies, leading to an increase in pilot initiatives across regions that provided incentive payments to doctors for each woman who chose not to have an abortion. The effectiveness of women’s clinics began to be assessed based on the reduction in the number of abortions. Consequently, the state motivated gynecologists to act not in the interests of patients, but solely for the preservation of pregnancies. State propaganda began to promote the idea of “life starting from the moment of conception” and the necessity of recognizing motherhood as the main mission in every Russian woman’s life. Officials and propagandists repeatedly invoked an image of Russia that never existed, a fantasy reminiscent of the American “baby boom” era of the 1950s in a Russian setting.
Professionals genuinely concerned about women’s health, rather than inflated efficiency indicators, tried to resist these changes the best they could. For example, thanks to the efforts of activists and human rights organizations, opponents of abortion were unable to push a bill through the State Duma in 2017 that would have required the mandatory demonstration of a “fetal heartbeat” to mothers and attendance at pre-abortion psychological counseling. However, this did not stop many gynecologists across the country from misleading women by claiming that counseling was mandatory.
Around the same time, a propaganda narrative circulated by the Russian Orthodox Church about an allegedly huge annual number of abortions in Russia gained traction. In reality, the number of elective abortions decreased each year during the 2010s, quickly reaching average European levels. The decline was influenced not so much by the initial restrictions on access to abortions but rather by the low number of fertile women due to the smaller generation born in the 1990s. Increased awareness of contraception methods also played a significant role. It is important to consider how abortions are accounted for in Russian agencies. State abortion statistics data includes spontaneous miscarriages, medically indicated terminations of pregnancies, and frozen early pregnancies. For example, according to the Federal State Statistics Service, the number of abortions in the Russian Federation decreased by 3.9% and amounted to 395,201 in 2021–2022; while the number of medically indicated abortions at a woman’s request decreased by 5.3% to 179,387. Thus, the number of elective abortions constitutes less than half of the total recorded. In 2020, the Ministry of Health attempted to change the list of medical indications for terminating a pregnancy, but outrage and resistance from feminist groups, pro-choice initiatives, and human rights organizations prevented this from happening.
The COVID-19 pandemic was an extremely challenging time for both women planning to become mothers and those facing unwanted pregnancies. Maternal mortality sharply increased across Russia. As the virus surged, obtaining an abortion became extremely difficult. During those months, some women were required to provide a negative COVID test taken the same day, or a positive antibody test, while others were informed that medical facilities were only conducting emergency surgeries during the pandemic, categorizing abortions as non-emergency procedures.
From 2020 to 2021, Russian authorities became increasingly concerned about demographic issues, driven by two main two factors. First, COVID-19 led to numerous deaths among the large generation born in the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. For the first time in a long time, women’s life expectancy began to decline, primarily due to COVID-related deaths among retirees and people of preretirement age. It also became evident that the smaller generation of Russian women born in the 1990s could not compensate for this excess mortality, and most women born in the 1980s had already fulfilled their reproductive plans. For instance: in 2021, there were 37.5% fewer women aged 20 to 29 in Russia than in the same age group in 2010.
At that point, the Ministry of Health made a highly irrational decision — to try to increase the number of births among young Russian women as much as possible. To encourage women to start reproducing, most of the maternity capital funds were allocated for firstborns: with the amount reaching 467,000 rubles (indexed annually for inflation, it increased to 630,000 in 2024). The maternity capital for a second child is currently 833,000 rubles, but only 203,000 rubles for mothers who have already received payments for their firstborn.
Such a measure may decrease the birth rate of second and subsequent children but does not increase the birth rate of first children. Generally, people planning to have children are likely to have one child regardless of the incentives, while the decision to have a second or third child depends on their financial circumstances. As for those who are firmly unwilling to have children, a few hundred thousand rubles are unlikely to motivate them to become parents. In this sense, the birth of a first child is much more closely related to values and life goals than the birth of subsequent children. Demographers assert that a truly effective measure to increase the birth rate in 2020–2021 would have been to stimulate the births of second, third, and fourth children among older women who wanted to have more children but lacked the financial means to do so. Sooner or later, the results of this oversight were bound to influence state policy in the reproductive domain, which indeed occurred in 2023–2024.
Several key points are worth mentioning in the brief history of reproductive pressure, which intensified from 2014 to 2021. During this period, some restrictions on reproductive rights were introduced as trial measures in several regions, and by February 2022 they were implemented across Russia. Sometimes these developments would make headlines at the national level, such as the scandal involving women in the Belgorod region who were made to have a mandatory meeting with a priest before undergoing an abortion. However, this is just the tip of the iceberg. When discussions were held in the mid-2010s about introducing the Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture course in schools, residents of certain regions were surprised as these lessons had already been mandatory in schools as early as the fifth grade over a decade earlier.
Training Grounds: Regions of “Orthodox Sharia”
Today, schoolchildren in Sakhalin are shown videos of abortion procedures, while propagandist Boris Korchevnikov travels across the country with his pro-life film “Mommy’s Letter.” Officials from various cities promise to screen his cinematic work in schools. This situation seems much less surprising when one considers the history of reproductive policies tested in some Russian regions during the mid-2000s, a sort of “Orthodox Sharia.” Women from Kursk recount how, in 2004, priests visited schools to show the video “Silent Scream.” While women in Moscow are astonished by the presence of pro-life advertisements on the streets and in public transport, in Kursk as early as 2014, pro-lifers covered nearly all the billboards on the city’s main street with banners reading “Mommy, please don’t kill me!” Since then, pro-life propaganda has continuously adorned the city center’s streets, and even construction sites have been plastered with giant posters declaring “Abortion is murder!” These have only begun to be replaced in the last couple of years with military service advertisements.
Most of the anti-abortion restrictions now being introduced nationwide have been previously tested in some form either primarily in the Kursk and Belgorod regions or also in Mordovia, Chuvashia, and other Volga regions. These restrictions include the prohibition of “coercion to have abortions” among medical professionals, the removal of abortion services from private clinics, the mandatory distribution of baby booties and greeting cards reading “I will be a mom” to those seeking abortions, as well as compulsory consultations with a priest and social worker (in addition to a psychologist), and requirements for a husband or partner to attend the consultation or provide written consent for the abortion.
Reproductive Mobilization and “Special Demographic Operation”
In 2022, many people left Russia in opposition to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, fearing repression and mobilization. While their numbers relative to the total population were not large, their departure was catastrophic from a demographic perspective. Those who left were primarily young, economically active, educated individuals.
Estimates from independent media suggest over 120,000 military-related deaths, while American agencies report more than 400,000 fatalities. Most of the casualties were young men, many of whom had not even had the chance to have one child. Due to the military actions, birth rates have significantly declined in border regions and occupied Crimea. Combined with the excess mortality from COVID-19 in 2020–2021 and the drop in births of second and subsequent children due to the reallocation of maternal capital primarily to firstborns, the demographic picture has started to resemble the “Russian Cross” previously seen in the 1990s.
We do not have complete and accurate data on mortality and birth rates for 2022. Some information is classified, and many deceased individuals are on missing persons lists. However, the panic among government officials, lawmakers, and representatives of relevant agencies in 2023 indicates that the demographic results of 2022 are most concerning.
In response, from 2023 to 2024, the state aggressively targeted reproductive rights with all its repressive might. First, the Ministry of Health announced restrictions on the free sale of emergency contraception but later allowed some of it to be sold over the counter. Nevertheless, certain governors, who were opposed to abortions, adopted a restrictive approach and informally banned the sale of any type of emergency contraception without a prescription. Overall, access to emergency contraception containing mifepristone —- accounting for half of all medications in this category — was severely restricted across Russia. To protect women’s right to access emergency contraception, activists established a special fund that provides medications for free to all those in need through donations.
In the 2024–2025 academic year, some schools introduced Family Education classes aimed at sparking students’ interest in “traditional values.” In some regions, several original initiatives emerged alongside the removal of abortion procedures from private clinics and the prohibition of “coercion to abortion.” These initiatives include payments for the births of children from combatants involved in the “special military operation” and 100,000 rubles for female students under 25 who give birth to a live child. Notably, no payment is provided in the event of the child’s death during childbirth.
The state is ready to coerce not just young people, but even very young individuals, into parenthood. Measures are being implemented in several ways: first, current schoolboys and schoolgirls are essentially deprived of information about contraception methods and reproductive choices; they are then obstructed from obtaining emergency contraception; and finally, access to abortion is restricted. The focus on very young individuals is deliberate, as they often lack the financial means to seek an abortion in another region or country. Moreover, schoolchildren (and sometimes students) often do not understand the costs associated with raising a child and how early motherhood can affect their professional development, career prospects, and quality of life. Young people are easier to mislead and pressure into continuing a pregnancy. The State Duma is currently working to create a separate status for a so-called student family, which would officially prioritize childbearing even while young adults obtain education.
In September 2024, it was reported that women in Moscow and the Chelyabinsk region began receiving SMS messages or phone calls offering to take a test for anti-Müllerian hormone (AMH), which supposedly allows for assessing fertility levels. In reality, evaluating only the AMH level without other tests, especially in women who have not yet reached perimenopausal age, makes little sense. Some healthcare workers and reproductive rights advocates believe that assessing AMH levels in women will soon become widespread across all regions, potentially forming the basis for developing a system of medical contraindications for abortion. In the worst-case scenario, prescription sales of hormonal contraception could be introduced, with low levels of this hormone classified as a medical contraindication. The contraindications for female sterilization may serve as a model: it is currently allowed only for women over 35 years old or those with at least two children.
There are also concerns about the recurring proposals to ban the free sale of baby formula. For some time, many maternity hospitals in Russia have been pressuring women to breastfeed newborns, often refusing to provide formula for feeding. A potential formula prescription requirement would ultimately tie young mothers to their homes, increase dependence on partners, and hinder some women’s ability to work while on maternity leave. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Justice is drafting a bill that proposes a mandatory pretrial reconciliation procedure for divorce cases. Starting January 1, 2025, the fee for divorce will increase from 650 to 5,000 rubles per spouse. Such measures appear to be the state’s attempt to force women to remain in abusive relationships and to give birth to more children at any cost. The proposed bill to “ban the promotion of child-free lifestyles” could entirely strip individuals of the opportunity to publicly discuss reproductive choice and to voice concerns on social media or in person about pressure from healthcare workers and relatives to have children.
Russia is currently facing an unprecedented situation. There are no legal obligations for childbirth or “reproductive duty” inscribed in the laws. Traditionalists often draw an analogy between childbirth as a duty for women and national defense as a duty for men. However, while one can still cautiously discuss mandatory military service, it will soon be barely possible to talk about refusing to have children in the realm of reproductive rights without facing potential penalties. What we have is not a “reproductive duty,” but rather a “special demographic operation.”
In this context, the Russian Orthodox Church and conservative citizen groups are actively promoting the following propaganda narrative: “Russia is fighting on two fronts — one in the ‘special military operation’ (SMO) and the other against abortions, childlessness, and low birth rates.” State-affiliated Orthodox priests, representatives of conservative communities, and pro-war Telegram channels publish videos claiming that SMO fighters from the front are calling on the authorities to ban abortions. Additionally, interviews with Russian soldiers circulate online, explaining that they went to war to protect “our family values.”
This situation is not only a response to mortality and birth rate statistics; it also reflects a general conservative shift that has led to a resurgence of old patriarchal values among certain groups. In authoritarian states engaged in war, there is often a militarization of motherhood, a “reproductive mobilization” of sorts. Women are increasingly viewed solely as resources for reproduction that must be utilized as efficiently as possible. This leads to ideas about the necessity of having children as early and as frequently as possible. Today’s propaganda equates a full family not just with one that has children, but specifically with a large family, with women’s roles defined solely as “wife” and “mother.” These messages bear striking similarities to propaganda used by states that had been involved in wars in the twentieth century, although in today’s Russia one could face criminal liability for drawing such a comparison.
It is quite likely that by the end of 2024, we will see new restrictive and prohibitive measures affecting women’s reproductive rights. However, women are not giving up. In addition to the Emergency Contraception Fund, Russian activists have created the “Right to Abortion” information portal, which collects data on laws, policies, and medical standards related to abortion in Russia. The Feminist Anti-War Resistance is campaigning for reproductive rights under the slogan “You are the one who fights, you are the one to bear children!” Currently, only practical activist initiatives that unite concerned people can help to counteract the anti-abortion activities of conservatives and officials loyal to the military regime.
___________
The creation of the article was supported by Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.
