Since the outbreak of the full-scale war with Ukraine, Russia has gradually turned into a proper dictatorship. We can observe this political transformation in the realm of propaganda, where speeches by prominent state officials and propagandists have increasingly embraced overt militarism and imperial nationalism. These political changes have far-reaching implications for cultural and historical heritage projects, architectural development, and urban planning. The occupied territories play an important role here, as they have become a springboard for the implementation of large-scale construction projects and the advancement of administrative careers.
On September 30, 2022, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin announced the annexation of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhya oblasts of Ukraine. This has raised many practical and ideological questions for Russian construction workers and architects. In what follows, we will discuss the challenges they have faced and the solutions they have found — solutions that are nothing short of a continuation of war by other means.
Architecture of Patriotic Militarism
The onset of the full-scale war marked the beginning of a new era in Russian architecture. It was part of the architectural agenda of the pre-war decade to attract high-profile architectural stars to take part in projects in Russia. Among these projects were Moscow’s Zaryadye Park, designed by the New York studio Diller Scofidio + Renfro, and skyscrapers designed by Zaha Hadid and Norman Foster, as well as other projects aimed at asserting the country’s international prestige. After 2022, most of the major Western studios left the country for fear of reputational damage, but some (such as the Dutch architecture firm MVRDV) decided to stay for the time being “in order to complete their projects.” Many famous Russian architects have also left the country, making room for new national staff. The agenda has now changed: the architecture of international neoliberalism has been replaced by patriotic and militaristic projects.
The opening of the Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces in 2020 signaled the beginning of the militarization of public architecture in the country. Located in Patriot Park outside Moscow, the cathedral was designed to “symbolize the spirituality of the Russian military.” The cathedral’s murals depict various battles that occurred throughout Russia’s military history, from the Battle of Lake Peipus to Afghanistan, while the ornamentation was done in the Russian-Byzantine style. This aesthetic was representative of the ideology of late Putinism together with its cult of victory and sacralization of the state. At the same time, the cathedral turned out to be very gloomy, and we can notice some strange things in its design — for example, its facade was painted in camouflage colours. But what no one expected was just how colossal this project turned out to be, and it was this sheer scale that brought Russian patriotic architecture to a fundamentally new level. Along similar lines, architectural historian Sergei Kavtaradze has pointed out that the cathedral looks as if it is dedicated to Mars, the god of war, while the image of the hands of the Virgin Mary seems to be borrowed from posters from the times of the Great Patriotic War. However, today we can see that the building does embody the spirit of our times.
In the years preceding the war, a number of war memorials and military-patriotic museums were established in Russia. Among these was the Rzhev memorial to the Soviet Soldier, a colossal 25-meter statue famous for its monumentalism, which was somewhat out of character with the military-inspired architecture of the time. The contemporary cult of victory called for a return to the architecture of a cyclopean scale reminiscent of the works by Soviet muralist Yevgeny Vuchetich.
There have also been attempts to find a new plastic language appropriate for military-inspired projects. For example, in 2020, the Zoya Museum was opened in Petrishchevo, designed by the up-and-coming architectural studio A2M. [note: the museum is dedicated to Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya who symbolizes the achievements of the Soviet people in World War II]. At the time, the liberal architecture magazine Project Russia praised the project for its bold memory work and for successfully finding a “fresh form” to articulate Russian patriotism and the “complex emotion of living through and experiencing tragedy.” “The exposition turned out to be complex, immersive, multimedia, and interactive — for example, anyone can add his or her relative who served on the front lines to the Immortal Regiment by recording a short video and scanning a photo of the relative.”
The true nature of these projects was revealed in the aftermath of February 2022. The Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces in Patriot Park has become a regular venue for the display of “trophy weapons” — military equipment captured by the Russian military from NATO countries — as well as for other military-themed events. The cathedral is featured in a series of patriotic videos, in which it is presented as a symbol of the militarized union of church and state. It is against its background that the male choir “Russian Format” performed their song “Faith is Eternal.” These objects laid the foundations of contemporary Russian monumentalism and determined the path of development of Z-architecture after 2022.
Unity with the “New Regions”
Thanks to an important state order, Dmitry Smirnov, the chief architect of the cathedral in Patriot Park, became the “chief architect of the New Chersonese” after the beginning of the war. In Sevastopol, a new major project was built according to his design: the New Chersonese Historical and Archaeological Park. The project was conceived as a “stronghold of Russian spirituality” and a symbol of Russia’s “unity” with the annexed territories of Ukraine.
After the war, the idea of the unity of the annexed territories with Russia and their alleged belonging to Russian history became an increasingly important part of the pro-government architectural agenda. In 2023, during the main Russian architectural festival “Zodchestvo,” it became the central theme. The “new regions” — Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, Donetsk and Luhansk — were represented at the festival with stands where attendees could discuss various solutions proposed by Russian companies for the integration of the “new regions” and the “restoration” of the cities destroyed as a result of the war. On the floor of the Donetsk stand was a picture of the devastated city of Mariupol, taken from above — literally inviting visitors to cynically trample on the bombed-out city while discussing plans for its transformation.
Architect Alexey Komov, curator of the Zodchestvo festival, presented the project “Lighthouses of the Russian World.” The project called upon architects to design symbolic lighthouses in “new territories” to “restore the sense of historical continuity and awareness of our commonalities,” as well as to emphasize “the presence of Russian tradition” in the occupied territories. According to Komov, “the project aims to establish an architectural style that represents Russian identity both within the country and in Russia’s new and future territories.” However, Komov did not elaborate on what he meant by “future territories of Russia.” Shortly after the exhibition, the first lighthouse was opened in the southern region of Zaporizhzhya, Berdyansk.
The theme of cultural and historical commonalities between Russian regions and the so-called “new territories” is also prominently featured in the exhibition “Russia, My History.” This exhibition was originally launched in Moscow in 2016 at the initiative of the Russian Military Historical Society and under the auspices of Vladimir Medinsky, the then-Minister of Culture. Back then, the exhibition pushed for a new ideologized narrative of Russian history, structured around the themes of religion, the state, and its struggle against external enemies. Since then, the project has undergone significant expansion, evolving into a comprehensive multimedia attraction that has gradually covered the entire country. To this end, over 25 pavilions, designated as “historical parks,” have been established in various Russian regions for the purpose of hosting this permanent exposition.
After the annexation of Ukrainian territories, the government ordered that similar expositions be established there as well. As a result, in 2023, the “Russia, My History” parks have already been built in the occupied territories of Luhansk and Melitopol. In the latter case, the former factory for the production of equipment for the food industry, known as “Prodmash,” was renovated for the exhibition. The facades of the pavilion feature imposing portraits of Peter the Great and other prominent figures in Russian history. School groups regularly visit the site for guided tours. The exhibition itself chronicles the history of Donbas, from its alleged roots in ancient Russia to the present day, aligning with the narrative of Russian war propaganda. According to one of the curators, the aim of the exhibition is to show that “Novorossiya and Russia are one, indivisible whole.”
“Revival,” “Return to Life,” and Reconstruction
The offensive of Russian troops on Ukrainian territory implied a specific approach to the landscape. Before the shock troops entered the territories, the area was subjected to a series of air bombardments. After such attacks, when the Russian Defense Ministry reported the capture of yet another settlement, it had already been transformed into a lunar landscape — its land covered with a patchwork of holes, pits, and the ruins of buildings. This is precisely what Avdiivka looked like when it was captured by the Russian army in February this year.
In the first days after the news appeared about Avdiivka being captured by the Russian troops, Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin arrived in the completely destroyed city wearing a bulletproof vest and tactical gear. He walked through the ruins of the city and declared that work had already begun on a new general plan for the city, promising, among other things, to arrange for the repair of residential buildings and to provide residents with water, electricity, heat and other utilities. After the military seizure of the settlement, it became a top priority for Russian construction workers to connect it to Russia’s infrastructure networks.
The occupied “new territories” have recently become the site of grandiose construction projects. One of the most ambitious of these projects is the reconstruction of Mariupol. The city, which had more than 400,000 inhabitants before the outbreak of the war, has been occupied by the Russian forces since May 2022. As a result of intense fighting and aerial bombardment, more than 60% of the city’s buildings had to be demolished. However, the new general plan suggested that it would take only 3 years to rebuild the entire city.
Nothing could stop the influx of new residents into the city — neither the large-scale destruction nor the victims of it. Some Russians and developers perceived Mariupol as a promising opportunity for real estate investment. Some of them even regarded the purchase of an apartment “by the sea” as a prudent, albeit risky, investment under the conditions of a declining market. Apartment buyers are encouraged by attractive prices, as well as by propaganda, which regularly reports that Mariupol is “coming back to life.” Russian social networks and online platforms are filled with advertisements for the purchase of real estate in the occupied city.
As a result, “return to life” and “revival” have become the main figures of speech used by representatives of the Russian authorities when speaking about the annexed territories. In this context, it is worth noting, for example, the comment made by Honorary Artist of Russia Alexander Rostov about the Mariupol Theater, the bombing of which was recognized as a war crime, was noteworthy. Rostov spoke of his task of “bringing the theater back to life” and “bringing back to life the actors who had not worked in Russian for a long time” because “for seven and a half years they had worked only in Ukrainian.” Apparently, Rostov implies that the actors of the theater were in a lifeless, zombified state when they were speaking Ukrainian.
Construction in the occupied territories, which Russia has declared to be its “new” lands, involves huge investments, rapid pace, and hundreds of commissioned and under-construction projects. It is also a huge market, which new players are trying to enter in order to make money. Thus, Russian development companies are opening their branches in the annexed territories of Ukraine, trying to attract workers with high salaries. At the same time, the workers often find themselves closer to the war zone than they originally expected, and instead of civilian facilities, they are often forced to build fortifications and other military facilities. It has recently come to light that German companies are also involved in the construction of facilities in the “new territories.”
In addition to civilian construction companies, certain parts of the Ministry of Defense play a key role in construction in the annexed territories of Ukraine. The Military Construction Complex of the Russian Ministry of Defense is a large organization behind the large-scale construction of military bases throughout the country, from the Chechen Republic to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago. Military construction workers build fortifications and military bases, but their involvement in construction work is not limited to military facilities. The Army Corps of Engineers has a long history of active participation in civilian construction. The propaganda parks in Zaporozhzhia and Crimea, which have been discussed above, were also built by military construction workers. Military construction workers set speed records while working on these facilities. According to them, the “historical park” in Melitopol was built in only 3 months.
In March 2023, Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov came to Mariupol to inspect the work of military construction workers and approve the commissioning of certain facilities. Being in charge of the military construction complex, Ivanov was the first to suffer from the massive purges that followed the dismissal of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in May 2024. Ivanov is now in prison on charges of embezzlement, which has now reached more than 2 billion rubles. Among all Russian officials, Marat Khusnullin made the most dazzling career thanks to the “new territories.” After working in Sobyanin’s team on high-profile redevelopment projects in Moscow, he was put in charge of “restoring” the annexed Ukrainian territories. It is Khusnullin’s organizations that are funding reconstruction work in Mariupol and other annexed territories. And it was he who accompanied Putin on his “working trip to Mariupol” in March 2023 and reported to him on the progress of construction.
Gas Pipes as the Safest Place on the Frontline
Of all types of capital construction, infrastructure plays the most controversial role in the context of the annexation of Ukrainian territories. As the front line moves, the “new territories” lose their connection to the old infrastructure and are “connected” to Russian infrastructure networks. Paradoxically, some types of infrastructure continue to function on both sides of the front despite the war. One example is the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod gas pipeline, one of the most mysterious facilities to operate during the war. It is a gas export pipeline built by the USSR back in 1983. It crosses the war zone in the Kursk region and extends through Ukraine to Central and Western European countries. At the time of writing, this pipeline is the only operational pipeline route for gas supplies from Russia through Ukrainian territory to Europe.
In a surprise breakthrough into the Kursk region in August 2024, the Armed Forces of Ukraine took control of the Sujanskaya gas metering station, the main export hub of the Russian gas transportation system. The very next day after the AFU forces occupied Suja, in the midst of the battle, Gazprom nonchalantly reported that it was using this pipeline to supply gas to Europe in transit through Ukraine at the amount of 39.4 million cubic meters per day. As a result, news of skyrocketing gas prices appeared in the media, but the very fact that a major infrastructure hub had fallen into enemy hands did not affect the transit itself. Despite the war with its huge losses and heavy shelling, the pipeline continues to pump gas efficiently, while Russia pays Ukraine for its transit services.
Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EU authorities have repeatedly promised to end gas transit. Although gas supplies have fallen to 34% of pre-war levels since 2021, Ukrainian authorities are still delaying the decision to close the pipe. Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria depend on the Sujan route, and it is not in Ukraine’s interest to cut them off. So the gas pipe continues to function — it has even been called the safest place on the front. In fact, drones and shells from both sides of the conflict have hit everywhere but the transit pipes. The functioning of the energy infrastructure shows that on the front line the two sides of the conflict respect many agreements, including tacit ones. For example, gas transit means that bank transfers and other complex cooperation between the two countries are taking place despite the hostilities.
Energy infrastructure is not the only type of connection that crosses the theater of military operations. Other infrastructure lines also cross the front. Some of them cannot be replaced and continue to function on both sides of the front. One example is the Voda Donbassa water supply system, the successor to Stalin’s Donbassvodtrest, which was established back in 1930 to supply Soviet steel mills and settlements in the region. In addition to many kilometers of pipes, the enterprise has an extensive network of 28 regional subdivisions, filtration and pumping stations, and canals. With the outbreak of war in Donbass in 2014, these facilities found themselves on different sides of the front, and some of them fell into the “gray zone” — territories without a defined status. Despite active hostilities, the company continued to supply water to settlements on both sides of the front.
The Style of Late Putinism
Despite the constant opening of new museums, monuments and memorials, it is difficult to say that the war brought anything fundamentally new to the style of Russian architecture. The style of Z-architecture is conservative and refers to imperial monumentalism, Old Russian, Byzantine and ancient architecture. Monuments to Russian generals and saints erected in the annexed territories are also conservative in their form, and usually, they are nothing but bronze statues standing on granite pedestals.
At first glance, the cathedral and museum complex in Sevastopol, with its references to Byzantium and antiquity, appears to have been built long before the dawn of industrialization. The obsession with the boundless past — that is, a kind of abstract, unclear past — is generally characteristic of the style of late Putinism. The state residence near Gelendzhik, which is known as “Putin’s Palace,” looks as if it was built in the aristocratic era of the 17th century. It is no coincidence that architectural historian Michael Mueller describes the palace as a conservative attempt at “narcissistic power,” symbolizing that Putin draws his power and rule from the past. The author of Putin’s palace, architect Lanfranco Cirillo, had previously designed office buildings for Lukoil, and Gazprom, and recently took a position as a senior vice president at Sberbank. He has since announced that he plans to start designing branches of the Russian bank in the “new territories.”
The emergence of “new regions” in Russia has become a pivotal event that the so-called Z-architecture seeks to conceptualize. Architects and construction project managers frequently evoke the concept of “unity” with these territories, seeking to identify the origins of “Russian tradition” therein and reflecting on its “revival.” It would be erroneous, however, to view Russia’s embrace of Ukrainian lands as a mere propagandistic assertion. In fact, the Ukrainian territories that have been occupied and formally annexed by Russia continue to maintain infrastructure networks that function on both sides of the front line.
Nevertheless, despite the peak of construction in the “new territories,” Z-architecture remains largely a marginal phenomenon. The majority of famous architects try to avoid it, realizing that the propaganda of the “Russian world” can have a very negative effect on their careers.
