An Unfortunate Tradition

In January 2025, a series of prominent scandals erupted within the Russian opposition, casting doubt on the credibility of the opposition media. It was revealed that Asiya Nesoevaya, a self-proclaimed “journalist,” had fabricated facts about the Russian-Ukrainian war for the purpose of including them in the articles she wrote for liberal media outlets. Subsequently, it came to light that Maria Chashchilova, under the guise of a legal professional, had falsified her biography in order to gain privileged access to confidential information concerning the human rights movement within Russia and internationally. Finally, Zhanna Nemtsova revealed how she had been “targeted” by GRU [translator’s note: the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation] officer Pablo Gonzalez. These incidents, along with the “Nevzlingate” scandal that erupted in September 2024, when the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) accused former Yukos top manager Leonid Nevzlin of orchestrating a series of attacks and actions against opposition activists, highlight the long-standing practice among Russian authorities of exacerbating internal divisions among their opponents with the help of secret agents. 

The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) and other security agencies had many predecessors: in the Russian Empire, they were represented by the Department for the Protection of Public Safety and Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, whereas in the Soviet period, they were represented by the VChK (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission) from 1917 to 1922, the OGPU (Joint State Political Directorate) from 1923 to 1934, the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) from 1934 to 1943, the MGB (Ministry of State Security) from 1943 to 1953, and the KGB (Committee for State Security) from 1954 to 1991. Although the KGB was abolished by the end of 1991, it was replaced by modern intelligence services such as the FSB. The methods of infiltration and espionage they practiced did not arise from nothing: many of the techniques used by the contemporary FSB were familiar to members of the security services as early as the 19th century.

— Approximately 140 years ago, Georgy Sudeykin, at that time the inspector of the Saint Petersburg Department for Protection of Communal Security and Order, authored a circular letter instructing his subordinates to “provoke discord and strife among various revolutionary groups with the assistance of secret agents,” “disseminate false rumors intended to dishearten and intimidate the revolutionary milieu,” and “discredit revolutionary declarations and opposition press, associating them with the work of secret agents and provocateurs.” Vera Zasulich wrote about this in her memoirs. Was Sudeikin a pioneering figure in the organization of systematic work to dismantle revolutionary structures from within, or did he have predecessors in Russia and Europe?

— I do not know whether the French police, who at that time had the most extensive experience in secret political investigations, had had similar experience, but there had been precedents in Russia before. We can recall the case of Ivan Sherwood-Verny, who first reported to Alexander I about the impending uprising of the Southern Society of Decembrists, and was then sent to the Decembrists as an alleged representative of some new revolutionary organization [translator’s note: the Decembrists were a group of members of the Russian military who refused to swear allegiance to the new tsar, Alexander’s brother Nicholas I, proclaiming instead their loyalty to the idea of constitutional monarchy]. He spent some time with them confined in the Shlisselburg fortress [translator’s note: the political prison where the Decembrists were imprisoned]. In recognition of his service, Tsar Nicholas I awarded him with the surname Sherwood Verny or Sherwood the Faithful. It must be said, however, that this was a deliberate attempt to investigate prevailing public sentiments. In essence, the objective was not to provoke discord between the Southern and Northern societies but rather to keep an eye on the given situation. 

Today, we are familiar with one of the most successful secret intelligence operations against the Petrashevsky Circle [translator’s note: a Russian literary discussion group of progressive-minded intellectuals in Saint Petersburg, organized by Mikhail Petrashevsky, one of the most prominent followers of Charles Fourier's utopian socialism in Russia] by a spy agent of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [of the Russian Empire] named Peter Antonelli. Indeed, his testimony alone constituted the foundation of the entire prosecution system for this ideological conspiracy. In reality, however, there was no conspiracy there at all.

Finally, we also know of the successful security operation by Vsevolod Kostomarov — nephew of the scholar, writer, and playwright Nikolai Ivanovich Kostomarov, — against writer Nikolai Chernyshevsky. In my opinion, in 1861, Chernyshevsky could not write the proclamation “Bow to the lordly peasants from their well-wishers” [translator’s note: a proclamation that outlined a critical reaction to the 1861 Emancipation Manifesto], for which he was eventually sentenced to penal servitude. After all, he was a man of caution. It is plausible that Kostomarov provoked Chernyshevsky into composing this proclamation by presenting himself as a member of some Moscow youth organization. 

— Subsequently, Sudeikin rose to prominence as the chief of the Saint Petersburg Department for the Protection of Public Safety and Order [translator’s note: the name given to the part of the police department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire that was in charge of secret investigations], which recruited Sergei Degaev, a member of the executive committee of the Narodnaya Volya revolutionary movement [translator’s note: Narodnaya Volya was a late 19th-century revolutionary socialist political organization, which declared itself to be a populist movement that succeeded the Narodniks]...

— It is true that we can say that a concerted effort by law enforcement to dismantle the existing revolutionary network was indeed conceived by Sudeikin. He had the exact same talk with all the arrested revolutionaries. The crux of the matter was his proposal to “initiate negotiations between a segment of the government and the revolutionaries.” Any investigator will tell you that in order for an individual to betray his comrades, he must first justify to himself this fragrant violation of ethical and friendship standards. It is essential to persuade the arrestee that their tactics are aligned with the overarching objectives of the revolution — for example, in the context of building communal socialism.

When in early February of 1882 a prominent member of the Executive Committee of the Narodnaya Volya revolutionary movement, Yakov Stefanovich, was apprehended by the police, Sudeikin and Director of the Department of Police Vyacheslav Pleve began to interrogate him. While Pleve [did so] cautiously, Sudeikin straightforwardly informed the prisoner that two political parties were engaged in a struggle at the moment — and this was indeed the case. One of the parties was a more conservative one, while the other advocated for the convocation of the Zemsky Sobor [translator’s note: a parliament of the Tsardom of Russia’s estates of the realm active throughout the 16th and 17th centuries]. In addition, the high-ranking police members consistently emphasized the fact that Alexander III was a supporter of the Narodnik movement. That is, they claimed that he was a supporter of communal farming and, like the members of the Narodnaya Volya, was opposed to the introduction of market relations in the village. According to the police, this dynamic created an opportunity for a certain bloc between a segment of the upper class and the revolutionaries.

Sudeikin spent a lot of time trying to persuade Stefanovich to negotiate an end to the terrorist attacks in exchange for certain concessions from the authorities. He even proposed to arrange Stefanovich’s escape from the Peter and Paul Fortress [translator’s note: from the first half of the 1700s and until the early 1920s it served as a prison for political criminals] so that he could communicate this proposal to his comrades. However, Stefanovich gave little support to the police officer. He only wrote his “Notes on Emigration” [translator’s note: in which he gave a detailed account of the activities of Russian revolutionaries abroad], which after the revolution were met with skepticism by veteran members of the Narodnaya Volya movement, who accused Stefanovich of betrayal. 

In any case, soon enough Sudeikin lost all interest in the help from Stefanovich, since during Christmas of 1883 he enlisted one of the leaders of the Narodnaya Volya movement Sergei Degaev. Sudeikin proposed the following plan to the arrested: he had to orchestrate Degaev’s escape from prison, while the latter had to disclose the names of all those in the party who were above him in status, and assume leadership of the Narodnaya Volya movement. The subsequent plan involved a series of orchestrated assassination attempts, which Grigory Porfirievich was to uncover. As a result, Sudeikin would move up the career ladder, while the revolutionaries would orchestrate an assassination attempt on Sudeikin and wound him. While he was recuperating, even more terrible events were to occur. As a result, Sudeikin would assume the position that Count Mikhail Loris-Melikov had under Alexander II — that is, the position of a de facto dictator. This would allow them to implement the social program proposed by the Narodnaya Volya movement. 

— The question inevitably arises here: did either of them believe in this plan?

— Degaev’s belief was not absolute, but he strongly desired to believe it. There is no doubt, however, that Sudeikin did not believe in the plan even for a minute. He was a man of cynicism and adventure, and it is possible that he could assume that there was such a possibility — however, it is unlikely that he was seriously committed to it. We can see this from his subsequent actions. Following his release from police custody, Degayev betrayed the entire military organization of Narodnaya Volya, including revolutionary and Executive Committee member Vera Figner, and arrived in Saint Petersburg, where everyone recognized him as the new party leader. As a result, the party now operated under Sudeikin's supervision. The next issue of the Narodnaya Volya newspaper was also printed under the editorship of Sudeikin.

Degaev was then granted permission to travel abroad. There was definitely an element of provocation against the emigre community. Degaev brought to Europe a letter from Stefanovich, who was imprisoned in the fortress at the time. It was done deliberately on the part of the Department for the Protection of Public Safety and Order. At that moment, everything was progressing towards the unification of such prominent revolutionaries as Lev Tikhomirov, Pyotr Lavrov, Maria Oshanina, Vera Zasulich, Georgy Plekhanov, Lev Deutsch, and others within the editorial board of the Narodnaya Volya Bulletin. The objective of the police was to prevent the future [Marxist] group Emancipation of Labor from merging with the Narodnaya Volya movement. Pleve and Sudeikin managed to achieve this goal. According to Plekhanov's recollections, the letter stated that the members of the Narodnaya Volya movement in Russia were dissatisfied with the rapprochement of the party's foreign center with those who, when the Narodnik organization “Land and Liberty” split in 1879, had not joined Narodnaya Volya but the more moderate organization Black Repartition. 

In Russia, the newspaper Narodnaya Volya was published illegally with a small circulation. Abroad, the Bulletin of Narodnaya Volya was a thick theoretical journal that could have become the main intellectual publication of the Russian emigration. The security services did not want to allow something akin to the Kontinent [translator’s note: the leading publication of the “third wave” of Russian emigration] or Meduza to appear.

— From what I recall, this whole interaction with Degaev ultimately had a regrettable outcome for Sudeikin…

— It is believed that Degaev was exposed by Lev Tikhomirov, an emigre member of the Narodnaya Volya movement, in an incident that occurred abroad, most likely in September of 1883. Tikhomirov decided to act in a way that would later be denounced by many: he did not kill Degaev, nor did he inform Russia of his betrayal. He simply let him go back to Russia on the condition that he helped all individuals against whom he had testified to escape abroad and arranged the murder of Sudeikin. After that, Degaev was free to go wherever he wanted to. 

Degaev returned to Russia, and yet nothing happened. That is when the well-known revolutionary German Lopatin appeared — he suited Tikhomirov and others very well since he was not directly connected with Narodnaya Volya. This was, so to speak, a fresh pair of eyes. Lopatin came to St. Petersburg and exposed Degaev himself. When he was abroad, he was not informed of the latter's treachery. Lopatin took Sergei Petrovich under his control. Together with the Polish revolutionary Stanislaw Kunicki and two young men of great stature — Starodvorsky and Konashevich whom he summoned from Ukraine — Lopatin orchestrates the violent assassination of Sudeikin with the participation of Degaev. After this, the latter sought exile. 

— After 1917, how did the secret police, known by the acronyms VChK, OGPU, NKVD, MGB, and KGB, work to destroy the political emigrant community from within?

— The most significant and successful operations of the Soviet secret services against emigration were the disinformation operation “Syndicate–2,” which was designed to lure Social Revolutionary Party leader Boris Savinkov to Russia, as well as the counterintelligence operation “Trust.” In the first case, with the help of several recruited members of the Russian Political Committee” [translator’s note: an anti-Bolshevik political organization in Poland that existed in 1920-1921], which were headed by Savinkov, he was persuaded that there was a liberal underground movement in Russia with which it was important to ally. It was a legendized underground group but Savinkov believed in it. Eventually, he came to Moscow with the Derenthal couple. [Social Revolutionary party member] Alexander Derenthal was apparently also an agent. Savinkov was arrested. 

Parallel to it, there was Operation Trust, an even more classic operation that involved two Tsarist generals living in Russia, Andrei Zayonchkovsky and Nikolay Potapov, as agents. Alexander Yakushev, a high-ranking Russian official, was sent to Europe, where he informed the Russian All-Military Union [translator’s note: a White movement organization that was founded by White Army General Pyotr Wrangel] of the existence of an organization called the Monarchist Association of Central Russia. In 1925, the fake underground movement organized a trip to Russia for Vasily Shulgin, a prominent representative of the monarchist emigration. Shulgin returned to the West unhindered and even wrote a book called The Three Capitals about his travels. He visited Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. 

The main task of these operations was not even to stir up quarrels in the emigrant community, but to suppress white terror. Representatives of “underground organizations” explained to their “comrades” abroad that on no account should anyone be killed or anything blown up, because this would disrupt “preparations for the seizure of power in Russia.” These operations were of paramount importance.

— Have there been any notable examples in the post-war period or nowadays of how the efforts of the security services led to the split or collapse of some opposition groups and organizations?

— In the recent past, the FSB has engaged in this type of activity within the Chechen underground movements. They have had notable success in this regard, especially with the rise of the Kadyrovs. They managed to split the Chechen resistance movement. 

When discussing dissidents in the Soviet era, of course, it is important to acknowledge the successes of the KGB. A notable example of this was the press conference in September 1973, where Pyotr Yakir and Viktor Krasin, two prominent figures in the dissident movement, publicly repented — this was a very big blow to the fledgling dissident movement [translator’s note: we are talking here about the trial of Pyotr Yakir and Viktor Krasin, who created the Initiative Group for the Protection of Human Rights in the USSR in 1969: in 1973 Yakir and Krasin took part in a press conference at which they repented before the Soviet authorities; there is also evidence that Yakir and Krasin testified against two hundred people]. 

Now, of course, it would be interesting to find out what role the KGB played in the split in Russian emigration between, let's say, [dissident writer] Andrei Sinyavsky and [his wife] Maria Rozanova on the one hand, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn on the other. There were obviously two opposing movements. One camp included Sinyavsky's [émigré] journal Sintaksis and [writer Viktor] Perelman's journal Time and We; the other was Vladimir Maximov's [Christian-liberal journal] Kontinent. There was, in general, a fierce war between them.

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